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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE 
WOODHOUSE AND ACC LEGACY 
Alan Clayton∗ 
In this summary of the symposium, Alan Clayton urges New Zealanders to recognize the uniqueness 
and importance of the original Woodhouse vision and the resulting Accident Compensation regime, 
but also encourages New Zealanders to look towards improving the system.  Having placed the 
Woodhouse vision within its historical context, the author argues that it has stood the test of 
subsequent developments well but he criticises the failure to properly focus on accident prevention.  
While he notes a recent change in both political and administrative commitment to accident 
prevention, he believes that there is clearly still much work to be done. 
I INTRODUCTION  
This conference has brought together a diverse range of persons to consider a number of aspects 
of the origins and historical development of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation 
(ACC) scheme.  It is an exercise whose utility has been enhanced by the participation – both directly 
as presenters and indirectly as audience interlocutors – of many of those who, in the words of the 
title of Dean Acheson's memoirs, were "present at the creation".   
In providing some form of commentary to these deliberations, I have chosen to follow the 
general contours of the conference's title, "Looking Back at Accident Compensation: Finding 
Lessons for the Future".  First, "looking back".  The ACC scheme represents one of the seminal 
events in a process of twelve decades of social policy experimentation in dealing with the 
consequences of personal trauma in society.  In a process of foreshortening of perspective that often 
results from familiarity, most New Zealanders perhaps do not appreciate the uniqueness of, and 
boldness of vision that underpins, their everyday arrangements for dealing with personal injury.  
However, different and striking as the current ACC arrangements are, in terms of an international 
perspective, they differ significantly, in some important structural and operational aspects, from the 
blueprint that was set out in the Woodhouse report.  Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the 
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legacy of the Woodhouse report(s) – plural given the fact of the Australian initiative of the mid 
1970s – separately from that of the ACC scheme itself. 
Secondly, "finding lessons for the future". As this is a lead-in to a conference next year that will 
consider, in greater detail, the viability of the Woodhouse framework and of the ACC model, for the 
future evolution of the New Zealand scheme and as a possible basis for policy development in other 
jurisdictions, I will confine myself to positing some headings and a limited exploration of some 
lessons that the author believes can be drawn from the quarter century experience of the ACC 
scheme to date.   
II LOOKING BACK AT ACCIDENT COMPENSATION  
A Compensation Arrangements for Personal Trauma 
In his paper for this conference, Brian Easton has provided a grand historical sweep of 
compensation arrangements going back a thousand years.  However, modern systems for accident 
compensation have existed for less than twelve decades with their fons et origo lying with 
Bismarck's Imperial German Accident Insurance Law which was promulgated on 6 July 1884 and 
came into force on 1 October 1885.  The first such initiative in the Anglophonic world was the 
English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 and New Zealand led the rest of the jurisdictions 
encompassed by the British Empire in enacting similar legislation in 1900.   
The reasons for the emergence of workers' compensation initiatives are many and varied.  In 
Bismarck's case it was, at least in large part, a pre-emptive strike by the Iron Chancellor to undercut 
the appeal of the emerging Social Democratic Party and an attempt to garner working class support 
for the Emperor and the German imperial system. The English legislation of 1897 represented a 
somewhat maverick Tory response, imbued with noblesse oblige, to once again "dish the Whigs" 
and their attempts at reform through successive amendment of the Employers' Liability legislation.  
However, behind such more immediate motives, there lay the need to respond to the human carnage 
wrought by the process of industrialisation commonly called the Industrial Revolution.  In countries 
whose legal systems were based on the principles of English common law, the fashioning by a 
conservative judiciary of a series of employer defences – the "unholy trinity" of the doctrines of 
common employment, voluntary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence as a complete 
defence – meant that relatively few victims of occupational trauma could successfully claim 
compensation even if they had the financial means to pursue an action for damages.  Workers' 
compensation represented the supplanting of the notion of "fault" for that of "cause" – "arising out 
of and in the course of employment" – as the defining trigger that could enable compensation to 
injured workers and some of those afflicted with occupational disease.   
Another major cause for death and serious injury emerged with the development of the motor 
vehicle. The first modern petrol driven internal combustion engine automobile was developed by 
Karl Benz and appeared on the streets of Mannheim on 3 July 1886.  This three-wheel vehicle and 
the four-wheel counterpart released by Gottlieb Daimler in the same year were not fast moving 
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vehicles.  A decade later the first recorded motor vehicle accident fatality – that of Bridget Driscoll 
– occurred on August 17 1896 in Crystal Palace, London, through the agency of a "horseless 
carriage" travelling at 4 mph. As motor vehicles became faster and more numerous the death and 
injury toll rose exponentially.  Over the next hundred years some 200,000 pedestrians alone in 
Britain would die as the result of motor vehicle accidents with more than ten times that number 
seriously injured.   
Despite the enormous loss of life and serious injury as the result of accidents involving motor 
vehicles, a response in terms of no-fault compensation arrangements proved slow in eventuating and 
then in a miniscule number of relatively circumscribed schemes.  The first such scheme did not 
emerge until 1946 when the Saskatchewan legislature in Canada enacted a system providing 
relatively limited no fault benefits.  In his paper, Richard Gaskins refers to the debate in the United 
States concerning the possibilities for no-fault compensation arrangements for personal injuries 
arising from motor vehicle accidents that extends to the 1930s and even earlier and which re-
emerged with certain vigour in the 1960s and fostered, particularly at an academic level, a plethora 
of different plans.  During the 1960s a number of American states introduced no-fault schemes but 
these were overwhelmingly very limited in scope, often in the form of essentially tokenistic add-ons 
to the tort system.  Even these efforts stopped in the mid-1960s, largely for reasons that are so 
masterly mapped out in Richard Gaskins' paper.  In Australia, two states – Victoria and Tasmania – 
introduced add-on no fault motor schemes in 1974.   
Outside of workers' compensation and the limited number of no-fault motor vehicle accident 
compensation schemes, the world of specific no-fault accident compensation schemes essentially 
comes to a halt.  The major qualification to this statement lies in the area of patient injury.  
However, apart from a few jurisdictions with very limited measures for a narrow class of infants 
with severe birth-related injuries, this is essentially a Nordic phenomenon represented by the 
Swedish Patient Insurance and Finnish Patient Injury Act schemes. 
Workers' compensation, in Sir William Beveridge's phrase, was the pioneer system of social 
security.  Social security arrangements, either based on social insurance principles or financed from 
general taxation revenue, have developed over the course of the twentieth century to supply a 
general social safety net and provide income and other support for those afflicted by a range of 
personal vicissitudes including those of injury and illness.  While in Europe, particularly in the 
period following the Second World War, there was a movement for the integration of workers' 
compensation arrangements into a wider social insurance framework, this was not the Antipodean 
way and in both New Zealand and Australia accident compensation and social security have 
remained largely separate domains.  The distinctions, differences and separate processes are ably 
sketched out in Margaret McClure's paper tracing the uncertain evolution of social security policy 
development during the 1970s.   
It is against this backdrop that New Zealand's pioneering comprehensive, no-fault accident 
compensation scheme providing 24-hour coverage for traumatic injury and some other conditions 
452 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
must be viewed.  It perhaps represents the major twentieth century milestone in a tradition of social 
progressivism that, especially during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, made 
New Zealand the envy of many European social theorists, a tradition that the French writer, Albert 
Metin, characterised as "socialisme sans doctrines". 
B The Place of the Woodhouse Reports 
The modern history of experimentation in social policy development in respect of accident 
compensation arrangements to which reference has been made above has generated a myriad of 
reviews and reports.  The overwhelming bulk of such reports are dry, technical reviews ploughing 
within existing furrows and rarely straying beyond established forms.  However, there have also 
been a number of influential reports that have broken new ground and laid the basis for often radical 
change to existing structures and practices.  The introduction of workers' compensation schemes in 
the various United States and Canadian jurisdictions, from the first decade of the twentieth century, 
was usually preceded by a commission of inquiry.  Some of these inquiries produced elegant and 
insightful reports, such as the 1916 report of the commission chaired by Arvid Pineo in British 
Columbia. As schemes developed, there was a need to review their performance and inquiries were 
appointed to discharge this task.  Perhaps the most ambitious of these was the 1972 report of the 
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, chaired by the economist John 
Burton Jr, charged with the task of undertaking a national review.  The report outlined a range of 
gross inadequacies in the benefit and other arrangements among the various United States schemes 
and set out 19 essential recommendations as constituting benchmark minimum requirements.  In 
part, the fear that failure to move on at least some of these minimum requirements would invite 
mandated federal action, prompted many states to move in the direction of bringing their schemes 
towards compliance with the 19 recommendations.   
The inadequacies and failings of the common law action for damages has been a recurrent 
subject of investigation, whether by formally constituted commissions of inquiry (such as the 
Pearson Royal Commission in the United Kingdom), other committees (such as the famed 1932 
report into the compensation of victims of motor vehicle accidents by the Columbia University 
Council for Research in the Social Sciences) or treatises by individual academics (such as Terry 
Ison's influential 1967 work, The Forensic Lottery).   
However, over this sweep of history, three reviews/reports stand out, at least in the experience 
of the Anglophonic world, as particularly noteworthy.  The first is that conducted by Sir William 
Meredith, an Ontario judge (and later Chief Justice) appointed in 1910 by the then Premier of 
Ontario, James Whitney, to review the current workers' compensation arrangements and recommend 
changes. In a series of reports, Sir William Meredith excoriated the existing arrangements, based on 
the English legislative model, as primitive and barbarous and recommended a new approach based 
on five concepts, now known as the "Meredith principles".  The Ontario legislature enacted a 
statute, based on the Meredith recommendations, that came into force on 1 January 1915.  This 
model was subsequently adopted by all other Canadian provinces.   
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The second seminal report is that by Sir William Beveridge, in 1942, which laid the basis for the 
modern British welfare state.  Beveridge had an established reputation as an authority on various 
aspects of social insurance.  As the recognised authority on unemployment insurance he joined the 
Board of Trade in 1909 and helped implement a national system of labour exchanges.  His views 
helped shape the pioneer English social insurance measure, the National Insurance Act of 1911.  In 
1940 Ernest Bevan, then Minister of Labour, asked Beveridge to review the existing social security 
measures which had developed in a somewhat unsystematic manner and make recommendations.  
The report on Social Insurance and Allied Services was published in December 1942 and 
recommended a coordinated system of benefits for those who were sick, unemployed, retired or 
widowed.   
The third member of this triumvirate is Sir Owen Woodhouse and his 1967 New Zealand and 
1974 Australian reports.  The New Zealand Woodhouse review was established as the result of 
complaints about a number of inadequacies of the then workers' compensation system in New 
Zealand, especially its benefits structure.  A liberal interpretation of the terms of reference for the 
Royal Commission by Mr Justice Woodhouse resulted in a report that recommended the move to a 
comprehensive no fault system that encompassed arrangements for personal injury generally and not 
simply such injuries that were occupational in nature.  The establishment of the Australian 
Woodhouse review – the National Committee of Inquiry into Compensation and Rehabilitation in 
Australia – was one of the first acts by Gough Whitlam, the newly elected Australian Labor Prime 
Minister in 1972.  Its primary remit was not the issue of the desirability or not of a national accident 
compensation scheme but the manner in which such a scheme should be implemented.  The 
vicissitudes faced by the Australian Woodhouse committee and its report is traced in Harold Luntz's 
paper.  While not implemented, the report of the Australian Woodhouse Committee remains as an 
important background feature – a Banquo's ghost – to ongoing debates in Australia concerning the 
future direction of accident compensation arrangements, a debate most recently sparked by crises in 
relation to public liability and medical malpractice insurance.   
These three reviews/reports – Meredith, Beveridge and Woodhouse – stand out for a number of 
reasons.  First there is the fusion of a powerful critique of the operational deficiencies of the existing 
system with a clearly articulated solution or sets of solutions.  Although it has become somewhat 
fashionable in current times to deride what is called "the vision thing", the great advances in social 
policy making have come from a well-developed view of future arrangements that are self-evidently 
superior to current conditions.  All three endeavours argued for a fundamental change in the 
principles and practices underpinning existing arrangements to a more rational – both in social and 
economic terms – approach.   
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Secondly, the articulated vision of the future was firmly grounded in a number of guiding basal 
principles.1  In the case of Meredith these were the precepts of "no fault compensation", "security of 
benefits", "collective liability", "exclusive jurisdiction" and "administration by independent Boards".  
Half a century later the New Zealand Woodhouse report also set out five principles upon which its 
proposed arrangements were based; those of "community responsibility", "comprehensive 
entitlement", "complete rehabilitation", "real compensation" and "administrative efficiency".  These 
principles have taken on almost talismanic significance.  In any Canadian debate concerning 
workers' compensation reform there is always reference to the "Meredith principles".  Similarly, in 
New Zealand testimony at select committee on changes to the ACC scheme usually contains some 
genuflection to the five Woodhouse postulates.   
Thirdly, the glue that binds the vision, the principles and the solution together is the language of 
the reports.  All three authors were master craftsmen of the English language.  A snippet or two 
from each of the reports illustrates this point.  From the final Meredith report:2 
It would be the gravest mistake if questions as to the scope of the proposed legislation was to be 
determined, not by consideration of what is just to the working man, but of what he can be least put off 
with or if the legislature were to be deterred from passing a law designed to do full justice, owing to 
groundless fears that disaster to the industries of the province would follow from the enactment of it. 
Next, Beveridge articulating the argument for a wider, undifferentiated approach to accident 
compensation:3 
If the matter were now being considered in a clear field, it might well be argued that the general 
principle of a flat rate of compensation for interruption of earnings adopted for all other forms of 
interruption, should be applied without reserve or qualification to the results of industrial accident and 
disease, leaving those who felt the need for greater security by voluntary insurance to provide an 
  
1  Although Sir William Beveridge, in his report, stated that "three guiding principles may be laid down at the 
outset", the approach is significantly different to that in the case of Meredith and Woodhouse.  The reason is 
that the Beveridge report was written at a time of war and this temporality is clearly reflected in the nature 
in which the guiding principles are stated.  Thus the first of his three principles is that of not being 
constrained by past practice ("a revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions, not for 
patching").  The second principle was "that organisation of social insurance should be treated as one part 
only of a comprehensive policy of social progress."  That is, while social security was an attack on "want", 
this was only "one of five giants on the road to reconstruction", the others being (in an interesting barometer 
of the values of a nineteenth century liberal) "disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness".  The third principle 
was that "social security must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual". 
2  Sir William Ralph Meredith CJO, Commissioner, Final Report on laws relating to the liability of employers 
to make compensation to their employees for injuries received in the course of their employment which are 
in force in other countries, and as to how far such laws are found to work satisfactorily (Toronto, 
Government Printer, 1913) para 105. 
3  Sir William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) Cmnd 6404, para 80. 
 SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE WOODHOUSE AND ACC LEGACY 455 
addition to the flat rate subsistence guaranteed by the State.  If a workman loses his leg in a factory or in 
the street; if he is killed, the needs of his widow and other dependents are the same, however the death 
occurred.  Acceptance of this argument and the adoption of a flat rate of compensation for disability, 
however caused, would avoid the anomaly of treating equal needs different and the administrative and 
legal difficulties of defining just what injuries were to be treated as arising out of and in the course of 
employment.  Interpretation of these words has been a fruitful cause of dispute in the past; whatever 
words are chosen difficulties and anomalies are bound to arise.  A complete solution is to be found only 
in a completely unified system of disability without demarcation by the cause of disability. 
Finally, Mr Justice Woodhouse in the 1967 New Zealand report:4 
The toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social progress and the statistically 
inevitable victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated response from the nation as a whole. 
The negligence action is a form of lottery. In the case of industrial accidents it provides inconsistent 
solutions for less than one victim in every hundred.  The Workers Compensation Act provides meagre 
compensation for workers, but only if their injury occurred at their work.  The Social Security Act will 
assist with the pressing needs of those who remain, provided that they can meet the means test.  All 
others are left to fend for themselves.  Such a fragmented and capricious response to a social problem 
which cries out for co-ordinated and comprehensive treatment cannot be good enough.  No economic 
reason justifies it.  It is a situation that needs to be changed. 
The upshot is that, for these – and doubtless other – reasons, the work of a hitherto largely 
unknown judge in the Antipodes stands as one of the seminal contributions to the field of social 
policy development in the area of accident compensation.  However, the proverbial difficulties of a 
prophet in his or her own land apply here as well, as we turn to the ACC scheme, the most tangible 
byproduct of the New Zealand Woodhouse report. 
C The Place of the ACC 
In his paper to this conference, Bryce Wilkinson notes that "[the accident compensation scheme] 
is not the Woodhouse scheme, but Woodhouse is its father."5  This is a felicitous characterization of 
the relationship between the report and the resulting scheme, a process in which the new 
Woodhouse wine was placed in old bottles, primarily the bottles of the preceding workers' 
compensation scheme.  There was a significant disjunction between the "bold spirits" of the 
Woodhouse committee in drawing out a new blueprint for the future and the political and 
  
4  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1967) para 1 [Woodhouse Report]. 
5  Bryce Wilkinson "The Accident Compensation Scheme: A Case Study in Public Policy Failure" (2003) 34 
VUWLR 313, 320. 
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administrative caution of the comparatively more "timorous souls" of the executive and legislature 
in seeking to make a radical change less threatening through the embrace of more familiar forms 
and practices.  The process by which the recommendations of the Woodhouse committee became 
transmuted into the statutory form of the Accident Compensation Act 1972 and the Accident 
Compensation Amendment Act (No 2) 1973 is touched upon in a number of papers, particularly 
those by John Martin, Geoffrey Palmer and Don Rennie.  This included their consideration by an 
interdepartmental committee, being the subject of an influential White Paper, and the further process 
of examination of the Gair and McLachlan Committees.   
The provisions that were finally enacted in 1972 and 1973 differed from the Commission 
proposals in a number of important areas.  These included the nature of weekly compensation 
benefits (particularly in respect of short term incapacity), the provision for lump sum compensation 
and in the principles of levy setting for the scheme.  The more innovative and novel approaches of 
the Commission on all three matters were rejected in favour of approaches that were more readily 
understood from past practice.  The inclusion of lump compensation provisions reflected a political 
recognition of some of the concerns of the trade union movement, but such provisions were also an 
integral feature of the former workers' compensation scheme.  Similarly, the rejection of the 
Commission's proposal for undifferentiated levies meant the default adoption of workers' 
compensation underwriting practice.  The adoption of the Commission's recommendations on these 
important features of scheme design would have had a significant influence upon the subsequent 
history and practices of the ACC scheme.  However, important as these matters are, the essential 
essence of the Woodhouse Commission report was implemented in the statutory measures that took 
effect from 1 April 1974.  That essence was the establishment of a comprehensive, pure no-fault 
system of compensation, providing coverage in respect of all personal injury by accident, regardless 
of cause, on a 24-hour basis.  This was then and has remained the unique distinguishing feature of 
the New Zealand ACC scheme.   
So in looking at the place and role of the ACC scheme, both in domestic New Zealand terms and 
in an international context, this feature of comprehensive no-fault coverage is both the starting point 
and the note of conclusion.  Throughout the many vicissitudes of the ACC scheme's quarter century 
history this grundnorm feature has remained basically undisturbed.  There have been occasional 
legislative nibblings at the edges of this principle of comprehensive coverage – usually as a pre-
emptive, atavistic response to the possible financial impact upon the scheme of particular perceived 
potential threats (such as Legionnaires' Disease) – but there has been no real pressure to revisit the 
underlying central principle of the scheme.   
While in one sense this situation may seem unremarkable and hardly worthy of comment – that 
is, the principle of comprehensive no-fault coverage appears (as near as is practicable in an 
imperfect world) to optimize both the social goal of equal and comprehensive benefit to New 
Zealand residents (and visitors) and the goal of economic efficiency, particularly compared to the 
transaction costs and other fiscal inefficiencies of the tort system – it is, in fact, quite remarkable.  In 
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terms of recent New Zealand history, the survival of the ACC in its present form is a most notable 
achievement.  The tsunami of neo-liberal, free-market change that broke over New Zealand during 
the excesses of the fourth Labour government and the succeeding National administration was based 
upon principles totally antipathetic to those (particular the notion of community responsibility) that 
underpinned the Woodhouse vision and the ACC scheme.  In its path, almost the entire 
infrastructure of state business enterprises was either swept away or shaken to its very foundations.   
While there were measures to tighten features of the ACC scheme, particularly in respect to 
particular aspects of continuing benefit entitlement, the overall structural aspects of the scheme were 
quite incredibly largely immune from this assault.  This is especially so since the ACC, as a 
corporate body rather than as (or part of) a department of state, was increasingly characterized as a 
provider of insurance rather than welfare services.  Similarly, the rise of the "law and economics" 
school to a position of hegemonic orthodoxy, traced in Richard Gaskins' paper, would have given 
buttressing support to the Rogernomics programme.  Much of the efforts of the "law and 
economics" school have been give to a theoretical justification – ironically in direct contradiction to 
most empirical evidence – of the efficacy and utility of the tort action as a mechanism for the 
allocation of losses suffered in society.    
The conditions appeared ideal for the dismantling of the ACC scheme as a state entity providing 
a unique, comprehensive, compensation programme.  This did not happen.  Although I have not 
seen this documented in any authoritative manner, my own view is that this situation owes its 
outcome to a very significant (and perhaps determinative) extent to the actions of Geoffrey Palmer 
within the fourth Labour Government, perhaps aided and abetted by the support and political savvy 
of other "Woodhouseans" in and around government and other institutions, including the Law 
Commission.   
The ground remained equally barren for a reintroduction of the tort remedy.  This may owe a lot 
to the nature of the legal culture in New Zealand, compared to other jurisdictions such as in 
Australia and especially the United States. Peter McKenzie's paper explores aspects of this culture in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, an environment in which the opposition to the supplanting of the tort 
system from organized elements of the legal profession, particularly the Bar and Law Society, was 
fragmented in nature and quite muted compared to the response from similar bodies in Australia at 
the time of the Australian Woodhouse report.  As well, there was a strong body of support for the 
Woodhouse approach from the academic legal fraternity, especially from a very distinguished 
faculty at the Victoria University Wellington Law School, including the late Colin Aikman, Dean of 
the Law School at the time of the Woodhouse report.  Influential members of the VUW Law School 
faculty, including Ken Keith, continued to provide strong support for a comprehensive pure no-fault 
scheme during the 1970s and 1980s.  While the language and precepts of the "law and economics" 
movement has intruded into legal discourse and scholarship in Australia and New Zealand, the 
movement has not attracted many committed acolytes among legal academics in the Antipodes.   Its 
major support base rests among economists and members of free-market "think tanks".   
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The most significant assault upon the basic structure of the ACC scheme occurred more 
recently.  However it was not overtly directed at its core principles but at the structure of its funding 
regime.  This was the move by the last National Government to privatize the employer account 
through a move to private insurer underwriting of this segment of the scheme.  The impetus for this 
move remains somewhat unclear and puzzling.  Apart from groups such as the New Zealand 
Business Round Table, for whom the principles of small government and the provision of services 
by private market actors constitute an article of faith, there does not appear to have been any 
concerted clamour from employer interests generally for such a move.  Australian insurance 
interests also appear to have been significant players in the lobbying for private underwriting of the 
employer account.  As the result of changes in a number of the larger Australian workers' 
compensation schemes in the mid-1980s, the vast majority of Australian workers' compensation 
insurance premium income has been removed from private underwriting.  Workers' compensation/ 
employers' liability insurance consistently represents more than a third of general insurance 
premium income in Australia and the private insurance industry (and its peak body, the Insurance 
Council of Australia) has been extremely energetic in efforts to re-open all the monopoly state funds 
to private underwriting.  All such efforts in Australia, over almost two decades, have failed to return 
a single jurisdiction to private underwriting. 6  New Zealand, with its unitary state and unicameral 
legislature, by comparison presented a promising opportunity.  
My view is that the Australian insurance industry was not so much interested in the premium 
pool that the New Zealand employers' account represented but in establishing some momentum and 
a successful precedent that could be used to help pry open the resistant monopoly state schemes in 
Australia.  The now failed Australian insurance group – HIH Insurance – maintained a full time 
lobbyist in New Zealand for an extended period.  However, the success in achieving private 
underwriting was short-lived.  The opposition Labour Party was resolutely opposed to the move and 
reversed it on achieving Government.  
Looking back over a quarter of a century, then, a (and perhaps the) major achievement is the 
survival of the ACC scheme in its present form.  What might have been a rare endangered species 
has survived institutional infancy and adolescence and now provides a more mature exemplar (and 
in the author's view, the most exemplary example) of a rational approach to personal injury 
compensation in the common law world.  This is a cause for quiet satisfaction rather than for 
hubristic celebration.  The ACC scheme has exhibited over the course of its history – and still has – 
some significant shortcomings.  This is perhaps the cue for turning to the second element of this 
presentation, namely briefly exploring some "lessons for the future".  
  
6  There is the case of New South Wales, where a recommendation in the 1997 Grellman report for a move to 
private underwriting was accepted by the New South Wales Government.  However, this represents a 
Pyrrhic victory in that there has been no enthusiasm among private insurers to return to underwriting in New 
South Wales unless they are inoculated from assuming responsibility for the scheme's "tail".   
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III FINDING LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE  
The first lesson is related to what – at least to my mind – has been the most serious shortcoming 
of the ACC scheme: its failure to develop any real prevention focus and substantial prevention 
programme.  As has generally been the case with Australian workers' compensation schemes, this 
role, in respect of occupationally related trauma, has been seen to lie predominantly with the 
occupational health and safety agency.  However, as leading European schemes, such as the German 
Berufsgenossenschaften and the Caisse Regionale d'Assurance Maladie (CRAM) in France, have 
demonstrated, workers' compensation schemes can develop extremely sophisticated programmes for 
effective, targeted prevention activities.  The ACC has undertaken initiatives in road safety, but they 
have largely been pale imitations of more developed programmes elsewhere such as those initiated 
by the Transport Accident Commission in Victoria.  In like manner, the ACC has been involved 
with prevention activities in other areas, including sports (particularly rugby) injuries and injuries in 
the home.  However these have largely been relatively ad hoc, uncoordinated endeavours.   
This failure may have historical roots.  My major quibble with the Woodhouse principles is that, 
while they specifically address both rehabilitation and compensation, there is no overt reference to 
prevention.  It is not enough – and is indeed unconvincing – to suggest that prevention is implicitly 
subsumed under the principle of community responsibility.  Having said that, the community 
responsibility perspective is, in fact, the starting point for what I would like to see as the future 
approach by the ACC to prevention.  That is, an approach that recognises the accident/injury process 
as one that is essentially structural and social in nature rather than one that approaches the issue in 
terms of individual foibles and deficiencies.  That is one that, for instance, recognises that motor 
vehicle accidents generally – in the words of a leading Australian accident researcher – involve 
"ordinary drivers behaving in an ordinary way".  Such a perspective leads almost inexorably to the 
approach underpinning the road safety programme of the Swedish National Road Administration – 
Vision Zero – in which countermeasures are seen as involving a whole chain of people from land 
use planners, road designers, engineers, motor vehicle manufacturers etc – all of whose actions 
contribute to the level of safety in the road system.   
Things may be changing.  It is pleasing to see that the current Minister has enthusiastically 
embraced the principle of injury prevention as a principal goal of the ACC scheme and that she has 
initiated a comprehensive New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy for which the ACC has a central 
coordinating role.  This is a very welcome change.  My principal reservation is that it may simply 
become a grab bag of disparate measures rather than a truly coordinated approach on the lines of the 
Swedish Vision Zero programme.  
The second lesson may also have its roots in the origins of the scheme.  Mention has been made 
of the fact that, in a number of areas, the Woodhouse Commission recommendations were not 
followed and recourse was made to principles and practices of the former workers' compensation 
scheme.  This may have perpetuated some of the incubus of the past.  In particular, a range of 
principles and practices with private insurance practice appear to have carried with them more than 
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a penumbral impact upon the operational practice of the new scheme.  These include the use of 
differentiated levies or premiums, the embracing of experience rating and sometimes an ethos of 
aggressive claims management (manifested, for instance, in sometimes draconian application of 
work capacity testing) that has appeared primarily driven by balance sheet concerns.  While 
administrative efficiency is one of the Woodhouse principles, this was enunciated in a spirit of 
public trusteeship, a concern that scarce public resources are managed in a responsible and non-
wasteful fashion; it was not formulated as a mandate for a Scrooge-like preoccupation with claims 
costs that borders on public misanthropy.   
Again, much of the weight of these concerns relate to the past – although some of them to a 
relatively recent past – particularly the period when the insurance aspects of the scheme were 
emphasised in a number of ways, including in the title of the governing statute.  As a long-time 
interested observer (albeit from afar), l have been heartened by much of the recent change in the 
operational ethos and practice of the ACC.  This appears to have gathered pace under the active 
stewardship of the current Minister and evidenced by such matters as the promulgation of the Code 
of ACC Claimants' Rights.  However, there is no reason to be Pollyanish about the future.  Despite 
the disavowal by the present Government of the principle of experience rating, there seems to be a 
strong residual hankering for this – and a number of related insurance pricing approaches – from 
both inside and outside the Corporation.  This is despite the fact that there is no convincing 
empirical evidence that these approaches have any real impact upon achieving their purported goal – 
bringing about safer environments – and strong empirical evidence of their distorting impact upon a 
range of scheme functions, including an inducement to greater disputation of claims.   
There has also been a recurrent debate about the funding principles of the scheme; whether it 
should operate on a full funding basis, pay-as-you go, or some intermediate basis.  Full funding is 
advocated on a number of grounds, including inter-generational equity in a long-tail system, and is 
the current ruling dogma in Australian compulsory insurance schemes, principally workers' 
compensation and motor accident compensation.  While seductively alluring in theory, it is largely 
chimerical in practice.  In a long-tail system such as the ACC it is an essentially actuarial notion that 
involves projecting out into the future –often forty years or more – estimated performance on a 
number of fronts.  These include claims incidence, claims duration, wage inflation (because of the 
impact on weekly payments of compensation), other cost inflation (particularly that for medical and 
allied services) and the return on investment upon funds held in reserve.  It is an assumption driven 
exercise and even minor departures from the given assumption on particular measures – for instance 
claims incidence and claims duration – has a major impact on the figure for overall outstanding 
claims liability.  Closed case examples – for instance the claims run-off for the failed Palmdale 
Insurance group in Australia – have often shown deviations of more than one hundred percent from 
the actuarial projection.  Thus, as scientific exercise, it is almost as pointless as the debate in 
mediaeval scholasticism as to the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.   
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Pure pay-as-you go funding is philosophically more appropriate for a comprehensive, state fund 
scheme as the ACC.  However, in practice, it also can have some practical difficulties.  Most 
dramatically, as the earlier history of the ACC scheme has demonstrated, under some circumstances 
it can lead to severe cash flow problems for the scheme.  In my view an intermediate position is the 
most appropriate for a scheme of the nature and scale of the ACC system.  It is to hold x number of 
years claims payments (at current annual payment rates) in reserve.  The precise number of years 
that x should represent is essentially a matter for judgment, but probably a number between six and 
nine would be appropriate.  Such a position avoids the arcane and fundamentally pointless exercise 
of positing a notional actuarially projected figure as to outstanding claims liability of the scheme on 
the one hand and the practical difficulties of pure pay-as-you-go on the other.   
Alongside any listing of qualifications upon the performance of the ACC to date, there should 
also be recognition of the strengths of its organising principles and operational performance, 
particularly compared to that of other schemes.  The first is that of a comprehensive no-fault 
scheme.  The strength of this model has been highlighted by the recent difficulties in Australia that 
have confronted a number of areas of personal injury compensation regimes, particularly some such 
as public liability and medical malpractice that are totally reliant upon the tort remedy.  It has 
illustrated many if not all of the deficiencies of the common law action for damages for personal 
injury that Geoffrey Palmer has outlined in his paper as being detailed in the New Zealand and 
Australian Woodhouse reports.  These include the failure of the common law system to compensate 
large numbers of accident victims, the waste of its transaction costs (legal and administrative 
expenses), the long delays in the delivery of benefits to those who do secure a remedy, any 
theoretical deterrent effect being effectively blunted by the presence of liability insurance and its 
impediment to real injury prevention.   
As well, the skyrocketing cost of insurance premiums has put insurance coverage – for instance 
for public liability insurance – beyond the economic capacity to pay of many community groups.  
The result of the public liability insurance crisis has been the curtailment or cancellation of many 
community sporting, social and cultural activities.  The crisis in medical malpractice and 
misadventure insurance has seen the largest medical defence organisation in Australia go into 
liquidation and the need for an emergency government rescue plan simply to ensure that many 
doctors would continue to provide medical and surgical services.  All Australian jurisdictions have 
moved to implement tort reform measures that have had the effect of limiting access to the tort 
system and capping various heads of damages.   However, these are knee jerk, band-aid measures 
designed to slow the financial haemorrhaging of the system through bearing down on benefits.  If 
anything they exacerbate some of the system inadequacies and inequities.  The common law system 
is a capricious, economically inefficient lottery for dealing with the consequences of injury.  
Australia missed the opportunity to adopt a more rational, equitable and economically efficient 
system in 1974/75 with the political sabotage of the legislation embodying the Australian 
Woodhouse proposals.  Recent Australian events have amply demonstrated the wisdom of New 
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Zealand's move in 1974 to a comprehensive no-fault scheme compared to the chaotic, inconsistent, 
limited and expensive mishmash of measures for dealing with personal injury in Australia.  
These recent Australian events have also thrown into relief the benefits of the stability of a state 
fund for financing scheme operations in New Zealand compared to the variegated system of public 
and private funding of workers' compensation and motor accident compensation arrangements and 
the purely privately underwritten systems for other areas of personal injury compensation.  As 
mentioned, the largest medical defence organisation, underwriting medical malpractice and 
misadventure insurance has gone into liquidation and many areas of medical activity in Australia 
have only continued to function because of an emergency government bailout of insurance 
operations.  Similarly the second largest general insurance group in the country – the HIH Insurance 
Group – has not only gone into liquidation but its activities are currently the subject of a Royal 
Commission investigation.  It is somewhat ironical that it was in fact HIH Insurance that led the 
insurer charge for privatisation of the employer account of the ACC scheme.   
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I come to this forum as outsider, in the sense that I live and work across the Tasman (on the 
offshore island as some New Zealanders would say), but also one whose ancestry makes me 
(proudly) half New Zealander, a heritage bolstered by strong family roots in southern Taranaki.  In 
visits to New Zealand I continue to be struck by a general lack of appreciation among most New 
Zealanders of the uniqueness and special nature of the arrangements in place in their country for 
personal injury compensation.  This may in fact reflect the fact that, for a considerable segment of 
the population, the ACC scheme is the only one that they have known.  However, in historical 
perspective and in terms of the nature of international arrangements, the 1967 Woodhouse report 
and the scheme that it fostered stand as seminal monuments to rational public policy development, 
in terms of arrangements for dealing with the consequences of personal injury.   
The survival of the ACC following the neo-liberal programmes of the fourth Labour 
Government and succeeding National administrations in its present form is a major achievement and 
blessing.  The basic foundations of the scheme – comprehensive no-fault and public underwriting – 
are sound.  However, many tasks still remain to be done.  The extension beyond personal trauma to 
other disabling conditions and the basis upon which this can be achieved is one major such task.  It 
will undoubtedly be one of the topics for the projected next symposium.  But, even within its 
existing mandate and remit, there is also much to be done.  I can think of few compensation systems 
in which there is such unrealised potential.  The development and implementation of a truly 
effective prevention focus is simply one such dimension.   
Given the nature of the world in which we live, it is certain that the ACC scheme will be faced 
with future significant challenges.  Perhaps the spectre of private underwriting will again raise its 
head.  The best defence is for the scheme, through its attention to social and economic efficiency – 
being responsive to claimants and in a non-paternalistic manner assisting them to return to their 
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former activities if this is possible and assisting them to rebuild their lives if it is not – to win the 
respect (and possibly even the affection) of New Zealanders.  This seems to be a road down which 
the present Minister is proceeding.  Those of us here who have a genuine pride in the scheme – in a 
critically supportive manner – may perhaps also consider how to contribute to the next quarter 
century evolution of the scheme.   
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